McKinney, H. L. 1972. *Wallace and Natural Selection.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Merrill, E. D. 1917. *An Interpretation of Rumphius's Herbarium Amboinense.* Manila: Bureau of Printing.

Moorhead, A. 1969. *Darwin and the Beagle.* New York: Crescent Books.

Rumphius, G. E. 1705. *D'Amboinsche Rariteitkamer.* Amsterdam: François Halma.

———. 1741–1755. *Herbarium Amboinense, plurimas complectens arbores, frutices, herbas, plantas terrestres & aquaticas, qua in Ambon, et adjacentibus reperiuntur insulis, ...* [Separate title page in Dutch, *Het Amboinsche Kruid-Boek ...*]. Vols. 1–4, 1741, 1741, 1743, 1743 Amsterdam/Den Haag/Utrecht; vols. 5–6, 1747, 1750 Amsterdam/Den Haag; vol. 7, *Auctuarium*, 1755, Amsterdam.

Sirks, M. J. 1945. Rumphius, the blind seer of Ambon. In *Science and Scientists in the Netherlands Indies*, ed. by P. Honig & F. Verdoorn, pp. 295–308. New York: Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao.

van Steenis, C. G. G. J. 1950. *Flora Malesiana*, series 1, vol. 1. Jakarta: Noordhoff-Kolff N. V.

Valentijn, F. 1726. *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indiën.* Amsterdam: J. van Braam.

Wallace, A. R. 1855. On the law which has regulated the introduction of new species. *Annals and Magazine of Natural History* (2nd series) 16:184–196.

———. 1860. On the zoological geography of the Malay Archipelago. *Journal of the Proceedings of the Linnean Society of London, Zoology* 4:172–184.

———. 1869. *The Malay Archipelago: The Land of the Orang-Utan and the Bird of Paradise. A Narrative of Travel with Studies of Man and Nature.* London: Macmillan. (Reprinted 1962, New York: Dover.)

———. 1870. *Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection: A Series of Essays.* London: Macmillan.

———. 1880. *Island Life: Or the Phenomena and Causes of Insular Faunas and Floras, Including a Revision and Attempted Solution of the Problem of Geological Climates.* London: Macmillan. (Revised and reprinted, 1892.)

———. 1889. *Darwinism, An Exposition of the Theory of Natural Selection with Some of Its Applications.* London: Macmillan.

———. 1891. *Natural Selection and Tropical Nature: Essays on Descriptive and Theoretical Biology.* London: Macmillan.

Williams-Ellis, A. 1966. *Darwin's Moon: A Biography of Alfred Russel Wallace.* London: Blackie.

de Wit, H. C. D., ed. 1959. *Rumphius Memorial Volume.* Hollandia: Baarn.

———. 1977. Orchids in Rumphius' *Herbarium Amboinense.* In: *Orchid Biology: Reviews and Perspectives*, ed. by J. Arditti, pp. 48–56. Ithaca: Comstock.

REPUBLIK MALUKU SELATAN AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMBONESE SOCIETY DURING THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD

RICHARD CHAUVEL
UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA

This article seeks to examine the political developments in the Ambonese islands which led to the proclamation of the *Republik Maluku Selatan* (RMS) in the light of the processes of social change in Ambonese society during the last ninety years of colonial rule. The analysis rests on the assumption that these political developments can only be understood in the context and structure of the society in which they occurred. The article will focus on various groups in Ambonese society, in particular the emergence of a "middle class" of soldiers, teachers and minor officials from the Christian community, a process of emancipation in the Moslem community, and a relative decline in the power and authority of traditional leaders.

AMBONESE SOCIETY

Before proceeding with the discussion, I would first like to establish the parameters of "Ambonese Society." Geographically, Ambonese society includes the islands of Ambon, Saparua, Nusa Laut and Haruku together with the coastal areas of southern and western Seram and coastal areas of south and east Buru. The region constitutes the Ambonese cultural area delineated by a network of intervillage *pela* relationships (Bartels 1977). Although *pela* relations had little direct influence on the events discussed in this article, *pela*, as an important element in a common *adat* heritage, does symbolize the underlying unity of Ambonese society, binding Moslem and Christian Ambonese together as members of one society.

In the last census of the colonial period, the religious composition of the Ambonese society was 65.9 percent Christian and 32.7 percent Moslem (*Volkstelling 1930* 1:91).[1] The Christian community was the product of contact with European missionaries and later colonial administrations, while the Moslem community developed from an earlier association with Moslem sailors and traders from Java, Makassar, and the northern Moluccas. Outside the town of Ambon itself, Christians and Moslems live in separate villages or *negeri* each with its own village head or *raja*.[2] The Dutch colonial administration ruled the Ambonese islands through the mediation of the *raja*. The town of Ambon was the center of

administration and commerce of the Ambonese islands and the Moluccas as a whole. From the 1920s onwards, Ambon Town became the center of political activity. In the late colonial period, aside from the colonial administration, urban society was dominated by Ambonese, although there were Chinese, Arab, Moluccans (from outside the Ambonese islands) and other Indonesians, most notably the Butonese, resident in the town.

The Ambonese islands are a region of Indonesia with one of the longest experiences of colonial rule—425 years since the arrival of the first Portuguese traders and nearly 300 years since the time the Dutch succeeded in imposing a monopoly on the spice trade. Under the Spice Monopoly, the function of the Ambonese islands in the political economy of the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or VOC) was to produce cloves for the world market. Cloves were delivered to the VOC against a fixed price, independent of the world market price. From the end of the eighteenth century, the importance of the clove trade declined, the interest of the VOC shifted to other regions of the archipelago, notably Java, and to other commodities. In the course of the nineteenth century, the Ambonese islands became an economic backwater and eventually in 1864, the clove monopoly was abolished. During the last decades of the century, with the exception of a few seasons, the Ambonese profited no more from their once-treasured crop. The attempts to establish an alternate cash crop failed and the Ambonese islands were left with a declining export economy and a subsistence economy under increasing population pressures (Chauvel 1981).

THE CHRISTIAN "MIDDLE CLASS"

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, a significant structural change occurred in Ambonse society: the emergence of an Ambonse "middle class" of lower officials, teachers and soldiers. Based on their education and their Christian religion, this group found employment in the Netherlands Indies administration. In the remaining years of the colonial period they were to be found throughout the archipelago, not just in Ambon. They formed a "middle class" in the sense that they developed a new network of relationships both with Ambonese *negeri* society and with the Indies administration. The emergence of the new "middle class" was related to the changes within the Ambonese economy as well as the process of expansion and consolidation of the Dutch control in the archipelago. For this expanding administration, the Dutch required manpower and employed thousands of Christian Ambonese. Since Portuguese times, education had been identified with Christianity. By the mid-nineteenth century, there was an elementary school in nearly every Christian *negeri* in the Ambonese islands. From the 1860s, new Indies government priorities induced a change in the nature of these *negeri* schools from strongly religious to a secular and practical orientation. In 1856, the first "European school", where Dutch was the language of instruction, was established for Ambonese (initially only *burgers*) and in 1869, this school became officially known as the *Ambonese Burgerschool*. In 1874, the government established the *Ambonese*

Kweekschool (Teachers' Training College), based on a secular curriculum, to replace the missionary teachers' school. These two schools marked the beginning of Dutch language education in Ambon. Dutch-language education was expanded until during the 1920s it consisted of three European primary schools, three *Hollandsch-Inlandsche Scholen* and one *Middelbaar Uitgebreid Lager School* with a total of 2,846 pupils (van Sandick 1926, app. 5). In Christian society, it was not only the children of the elite—the children of *raja* and *pendeta* (pastor) families—who had the opportunity of a Dutch language education; the able children of non-elite families also had the chance to achieve social standing and wealth in a colonial status system based on educational and occupational accomplishment, rather than *adat* prescription.

The graduates of these Dutch language schools, together with Ambonese soldiers, came to epitomize "Ambonese" in the eyes of both the Dutch and other Indonesians. It was taken for granted that their loyalty and identification with the Dutch represented popular opinion in Ambonese society, whereas, in fact, these two groups had only recently emerged from Ambonese Christian society and constituted a new class.

THE KNIL

According to the military tradition of the colonial army, Ambonese soldiers had served the Dutch since Kapitan Jonker and his troops helped the VOC defeat Makassar and Banten. However, systematic recruitment of Ambonese only began early in the nineteenth century, when Christian Ambonese became the preferred soldiers. From that time, Christian Ambonese soldiers were given a special status—*een bevoorrechte positie*—in the KNIL (*Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger*, Royal Netherlands Indies Army). Enlistment money paid to Ambonese was higher than that paid to Javanese or Malay recruits. Ambonese soldiers also received "European" rations together with superior clothing and accommodations. How did this come about?

The Netherlands was a small European state which in the course of the nineteenth century succeeded in extending its administration throughout the Indonesian archipelago. It was never able to recruit sufficient numbers of soldiers and officers from Europe for the KNIL, because the Dutch population was too small and military service was not a high status occupation. As a consequence, the KNIL was always dependent on the Javanese for its manpower, despite the fact that Dutch officers disparaged the fighting qualities and suspected the loyalties of their Javanese troops, but there were always sufficient numbers of recruits. The role of Ambonese (and Menadonese), together with the Dutch themselves, was to balance the Javanese. The Ambonese and Menadonese soldiers were thought to be more loyal to the Dutch, because of their religion, as well as brave and capable. They were given their special status because, until the end of the nineteenth century, they always proved to be reluctant recruits. The superior pay and conditions also served to facilitate Ambonese identification with Dutch interests rather than their Javanese

comrades-in-arms. Closely intertwined with this was the cultivation of an Ambonese military tradition particularly during the protracted and bloody war in Aceh. The tradition emphasized the Ambonese loyalty to the House of Orange and their superiority over other indigenous soldiers. Ambonese and Menadonese soldiers thought of themselves as partners of the Dutch: together they established and maintained *rust en orde* in the Indies (see Dames 1954, van Gent 1924).

According to this military tradition, the Ambonese soldier had always been loyal to the Dutch—*Ambon door de eeuwen trouw*—but in reality the Ambonese were reluctant recruits. In 1870 when the Dutch campaign in Aceh commenced, there were only 347 Ambonese soldiers in the KNIL out of a total force of about 30,000 troops (*Koloniaal Verslag* 1874:24). With the war, the requirement for new recruits increased. In order to facilitate recruitment in Ambon, the KNIL paid Christian *raja* 25 guilders (later increased to 50 guilders) for each of their subjects who enlisted. Every year, two Ambonese soldiers were sent back to their *negeri*, on leave, to assist in the recruitment campaign. In 1873 and 1875, enlistment money and pensions were raised again. From 1879, Dutch language schools were established in garrison towns throughout the archipelago especially for the children of Ambonese and Menadonese soldiers. These measures notwithstanding, recruitment of Ambonese only increased slowly. The Dutch had to wait until the 1890s before Ambonese recruitment met demand. During that decade, 1,980 Ambonese enlisted compared with 718 during the 1880s and 427 during the 1870s (*Koloniaal Verslag* 1871–1901).[3]

To explain this pattern of recruitment, we must return to the economic conditions in the Ambonese islands after the abolition of the spice monopoly in 1864. During the 1870s and 1880s, Ambonese producers enjoyed clove prices which were on average higher than the old monopoly price. However, in 1890, the price of cloves on the world market crashed and remained depressed until after independence (*Koloniaal Verslag* 1861–1900). It can be said that during the last decades of the nineteenth century, particularly after 1890, the difference in material standard of living and the opportunity for social mobility between *negeri* society in the Ambonese islands and what was offered by the KNIL increased considerably. Precisely at that time, the Dutch finally were able to recruit sufficient numbers of Ambonese. In the nineteenth century, Ambonese were reluctant recruits; in the twentieth century, they were to become dependent on the KNIL for advancement. Loyalty to the House of Orange, as celebrated in the military tradition, meant in reality economic dependence.

The Ambonese islands became an economic backwater. Western education, particularly the Dutch language schools, provided an avenue of escape. Ambitious young Christians who were able to pass the *kleinambtenaars examen* could become officials in the expanding colonial administration. Their less able, but fit, compatriots could enlist in the KNIL. At the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, thousands of Christians left Ambon to work for the Indies administration. By 1930, at least 16 percent of the Christian Ambonese community lived and worked outside the Moluccas (*Volkstelling 1930* 5:24, table 2, 40–41; 1:18; 3:212).[4] The Christian "middle class" became, to a degree, alienated from the society of the Ambonese islands because, physically, they spent their working lives elsewhere in the archipelago and because their colonially derived status—the soldier's *bevoorrechte positie*—was only partially recognized in *negeri* society still strongly influenced by the *adat* status system. Not infrequently, soldiers and officials returning to Ambon with their pension and an ambition to become leaders were frustrated and unfulfilled, at least in part because experience and standing acquired in the world outside was not recognized or valued at home.

EMANCIPATION OF THE MOSLEM COMMUNITY

Ambonese Moslems did not participate in the late colonial enterprise. They were not recruited for the KNIL because they were not able to fulfill the function of "Ambonese" soldiers, i.e., Christian soldiers serving as a counterweight to their Moslem comrades from elsewhere in the archipelago. *Raja* of Muslim *negeri* were not paid for each of their subjects recruited. If an Ambonese Moslem enlisted, he enjoyed the same pay and conditions as his Javanese comrades rather than those of his fellow Ambonese. Only on the eve of World War II did the Dutch begin to recruit Ambonese Moslems on short contracts.

In the Ambonese islands, western education had become identified with Christianity. The first elementary schools were established in six Moslem *negeri* during the 1920s. These schools offered three rather than five years of education. Moreover, they received a smaller subsidy from the government and their teachers were less well trained than in Christian *negeri* (Schmidt 1924). Participation of Moslems in Dutch language education was very limited. In 1926, less than 5 percent of the pupils were Moslems, most of whom were either the children of *raja* families or non-Ambonese Moslems from Ambon Town (van Sandick 1926, vol. 5, app. 11). This situation was not simply a consequence of Dutch policy. Moslems themselves often regarded enlisting in the KNIL and attending a government school as akin to becoming a Christian (Tausikal 1951:387).

Nonparticipation of Moslems in the colonial enterprise did not mean that the Moslem community was not influenced by the changes in the colonial system from the late nineteenth century. The abolition of the clove monopoly, together with improved transportation, facilitated a revival of contact between the Moslem community in Ambon and the Islamic centers throughout the archipelago and beyond. For example, in the Residency of Amboina in 1870, there were only 36 *haji*. During the following decades, the numbers of Moslems who went on the pilgrimage each year gradually increased from dozens to hundreds by the 1920s (*Politiek Verslag Residentie Amboina* 1870; *Koloniaal Verslag*, 1871–1898; van Sandick 1926, vol. Moslems). The *haj* became a channel of new ideas as well as a realization that belief and practice of Moslems outside Ambon was not always the same as among Ambonese Moslems. The *haj* played an important part in the process of renewal in Moslem *negeri*. Ambonese Moslems also became sailors and peddlers. Their experience in the outside world tended to strengthen their

identification as Moslems and with their co-religionists elsewhere in the archipelago. In contrast, the experience of Christian Ambonese as servants of the Indies government served to distinguish them from their fellow Indonesians. The Christian emigres developed a sense of superiority to other Indonesians and identified themselves with Dutch interests.

With the emergence of the Indonesian nationalist movement, Ambonese Christians, particularly emigres, were confronted with a dilemma. They were among the first Indonesians to enjoy the fruits of western education and the opportunities of social mobility that education provided. They quickly realized the possibilities of further advancement to be gained through the establishment of their own social, and later political, organizations. Just a year after *Boedi Oetomo*, the *Ambonschestudiefonds* was established to provide young able Christians with scholarships to support further studies. The *Ambonschestudiefonds* was led by emigres, mostly government officials, while the bulk of its members were soldiers (Manusama 1919). The dilemma faced by the emigres was the extent to which emancipation and advancement could be obtained through working within the colonial system. Would they remain satisfied with their *bevoorrechte positie*—indeed, higher than other Indonesians but still not equal with the Dutch? Or would they fight with their fellow Indonesians for independence and risk domination as a small religious and ethnic minority? Two orientations are discernible in Ambonese social and political organizations before the Pacific War: those who worked for emancipation within the colonial system and those who realized that advancement within the colonial system would always be very restricted with emancipation only possible in an independent Indonesia.

Moslem Ambonese were not confronted by this dilemma. In the Moslem community only the *raja* had a vested interest in the colonial status quo and felt to a degree dependent on the Indies administration for their own status. In 1917, a branch of *Insulinde* was established in Ambon and six years later was replaced by *Sarekat Ambon*. These two organizations were led by Dutch-educated Christians, but a large proportion of their membership was drawn from the Moslem community.

THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

The *raja* in each *negeri* was the linchpin in the colonial system of government in the Ambonese islands. He was the intermediary between the Indies authorities and the *negeri* society. The *raja* had to perform the most difficult and at times conflicting functions. He was, in the first place, the head of the *negeri* and its representative in the outside world. He saw himself as protector of his people against superior authorities. Secondly, he considered himself to be the representative of the highest authority of the Dutch state and was formally appointed by the monarch. Thirdly, he was an agent of the colonial state. During the clove monopoly, the *raja* was the channel through which demands for labor and produce were made and through whom the cloves were delivered. After the clove monopoly, he was responsible for collecting taxes, organizing corvee and maintaining law and order.

The legitimacy of the *raja* in the *adat* community rested on inheritance through the appropriate *mata rumah* (patrilineal clan). The prosperity and harmony of the *negeri* depended on having the "right" person as raja. The colonial authorities recognized the Ambonese ideal of legitimacy and endeavored to see that it was implemented. This was often more difficult than it would seem. The *raja mata rumah* was in many cases extensive and could provide a number of potential candidates, while in some *negeri* there was more than one *mata rumah* which could lay claim to the position. Rival claims for leadership in the *negeri* were a significant source of instability and, as such, a concern for the colonial administration. This appears to have been the case since the establishment of VOC authority (Knaap 1987:48–49). In the *Molukken Publicatie* of 1824, which established the foundation of administration for the remainder of the colonial period, among the many "accusations" leveled at the Ambonese was that:

> you hate and fail to appreciate the lawful authority of the leaders, descended from your old families, because their interests were not yours (*Gouvernements Gazette* 1824, nr. 19a).

The *Molukken Publicatie* endeavored to establish a new relationship between the *raja* and his subjects. Under the monopoly, the *raja*'s economic welfare rested on the *negeri* population. The *raja* received a percentage of the clove harvest known as *hasil geld* as well as *pitis geld*, calculated at 4 percent of the *negeri* clove harvest. These contributions disappeared with the monopoly, although the *raja* was given some financial compensation. Perhaps more important were two forms of labor services, the first, *karja trop* for the provision of labor for the harvest and, the second, *kwartodienst* (*hakikil* for women) for personal services for the *raja* and his family. These two forms of corvee were abolished in 1881 and 1920 respectively and the *raja* was compensated, inadequately, by a *toelage* (contribution) from the government. The net effect of these changes was that the *raja* was less well off materially and the source of his support had changed from the *negeri* to the government. These reduced circumstances inhibited many raja from playing the expected role as patron in the *negeri*. Many fell into debt. Government employees in the *negeri*, teachers and pastors, were often wealthier than the *raja*. *Raja* became more dependent on the voluntary support of their people (Residentie Amboina 1880, 1881; Ouwerling 1932:42).

In the late 1910s and early 1920s, the age old disputes between *raja* and their subjects assumed a new character. The newly established political parties based in Ambon Town became involved on the side of the opposition, providing a channel to articulate opposition group interests to the broader Ambonese community as well as a provide new ideas and organization. Political party involvement transformed traditional *negeri* conflicts into one of the people versus the *raja* as the representative of the government. In a number of *negeri*, this outside involvement shifted the odds in the conflict in favor of the opposition groups at a time when the *raja* were beginning to feel the pinch of their reduced material circumstances.

Government intervention was required on a number of occasions to maintain the *raja* (van Sandick 1927).

After A. J. Patty, the Sarekat Ambon leader, was exiled from Ambon in 1925, the colonial authorities were able to insulate the *negeri* from outside political influence and protect the *raja* from having to compete with nationalist politicians. Until the outbreak of the Pacific War, the *raja* played a dominant role in the *Ambonraad* (Ambon Council), the senior members of the local administration (*bestuursassistent*, etc.) and some of the Ambonese representatives in the *Volksraad* were chosen from their number. At the same time, the small group of nationalist politicians were kept at the periphery of colonial society and prohibited from any activities outside Ambon Town, but forced through these circumstances to develop a resilience and a capacity to organize independently or, rather, in defiance of the Dutch. In retrospect, the long-term cost of this protection was great. Although within their own *negeri* most *raja* maintained their authority in matters of *adat* and internal organization, few *raja* developed "modern" political skills and extended their influence beyond their *negeri*. After the war, Ambonese began to see, with respect to the *raja*, a distinction between "*adat*" and "politics." In the former, the *raja* were respected, in the latter, respect was dependent on acquired leadership qualities.

OCCUPATION AND REVOLUTION

On 31 January 1942, within 24 hours, the Japanese brought down the curtain on 286 years of Dutch rule in the Ambonese islands. During the three-and-a-half years which followed, the policies and practices of the Japanese administration served to accelerate the processes of social and political change described above. This was particularly so in areas of administration and the relations between the two religious communities.

The Japanese replaced the officials from Ambon's most distinguished *raja* families with nationalist politicians. E. U. Pupella, the Sarekat Ambon leader, was appointed as *Bun ken cho* (Head of the Subregency of Ambon Island) and his colleagues were given other senior positions in the local administration. To symbolize the role reversal that occurred amongst Pupella's responsibilities was the supervision of the election of *raja* in *negeri*, into which he was not allowed to enter before the war. Youth organizations like *Seinendan* and Ambon *Hookoo kai* were mobilized under nationalist leadership. The Japanese-sponsored newspaper, *Sinar Matahari*, had a nationalist editor.

The surrender of the Indies government meant that the Moluccan Protestant Church lost its benefactor and protector. Early in the occupation, the Church suffered considerable repression and a number of its *pendeta* were killed. At the same time, the Japanese established an Islamic organization, *Djamijah Islamijah Ceram*, to promote the process of renewal and unity in the Moslem community. A Japanese-sponsored Christian organization followed only later.

The Japanese succeeded in shifting the balance of Ambonese society. In a reversal of Dutch practice, they supported the nationalists instead of the *adat* elite and the Moslem community more enthusiastically than the Christians (see Chauvel 1985).

In September 1945, officials of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, with the assistance of the Australian Army, re-established the Dutch administration in Ambon. However, the Dutch were not able to reimpose the prewar political quarantine nor to reverse the processes of social change. Within the Dutch-sponsored *Negara Indonesia Timur* (NIT, State of East Indonesia), Ambon became the capital of the *Daerah Maluku Selatan* with its own fledgling democratic institutions. In 1946 and in 1948, elections were held for the *Dewan Maluku Selatan* (DMS, South Moluccan Council). In both of these elections, the *Partai Indonesia Merdeka* (PIM), under the leadership of E. U. Pupella, the former *Bun ken cho*, emerged as the strongest and best organized of the political parties. Like the nationalist parties before the war, PIM was a coalition, most of whose leaders were Christians, while the membership was substantially Moslem. It is as ironic as it is symbolic of the rapid changes in Ambonese society, that just when the Dutch unveiled the *Door de eeuwen Trouw* monument in Ambon to commemorate the loyalty of the Ambonese, the majority of members of the Dutch-sponsored *Dewan Maluku Selatan* no longer subscribed to those values nor to that interpretation of Ambonese colonial history.

REPUBLIK MALUKU SELATAN

The Nationalists' domination of the DMS, and finally the local administration, did not mean that they controlled Ambonese society. Just four months after the formal transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, the *Republik Maluku Selatan* (RMS) was proclaimed. The proclamation was made in a political atmosphere of great uncertainty caused by the Westerling-led *Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil* (APRA) revolt in West Java and the Andi Azis affair in Makassar. The principal forces behind the proclamation were some emigre politicians under the leadership of Ir. J. A. Manusama and Mr. Dr. Chr. Soumokil and a group of *raja*, with the support of and pressure from Ambonese KNIL soldiers, recently returned to Ambon and awaiting the "reorganization" of the colonial army.

In the context of the analysis of this article, the leaders and supporters of the RMS came from those groups within Ambonese society which had been the beneficiaries of the colonial presence. They were concerned that if the Jakarta government established effective control in Ambon, their status, influence and offices would be threatened. Perhaps more importantly, the RMS can be seen as an attempt by these groups to reverse the processes of social change of the preceding decades and to (re-)establish their own position in Ambonese society.

The remainder of the article will examine the principal promoters of the RMS in the context of the processes of social change outlined above.

THE EMIGRE "MIDDLE CLASS"

Among the key actors in the events which led to the proclamation of the RMS were members of the Christian "middle class", in particular, Manusama, Soumokil and Alex Nanlohy. They epitomized the emigre Ambonese—born, raised and educated in a Dutch-speaking Indies bureaucratic environment. Manusama escaped from the Revolution in Java, first to Makassar, then to Ambon where he became the head of the new secondary school (*Algemene Middelbare School*) and was appointed as a representative of the emigre community in the DMS. Soumokil had briefly visited Ambon twice as Minister of the NIT government before he fled to Ambon as the Andi Azis affair was collapsing in Makassar. Nanlohy, who arrived from Java in 1947, and Manusama, like so many emigres before them, endeavored to play a prominent role in the emerging democratic institutions of postwar Ambon. Not unlike the *raja*, they had neither the political experience, skills, nor organization to compete with the nationalist politicians. Manusama and Nanlohy failed to win seats in the second DMS elections, despite standing in two constituencies. Manusama was aware that as an outsider, he was viewed with some suspicion, particularly by the *raja*. He himself felt a considerable unease and ignorance about *negeri* society. He resisted the pressed invitations of the *raja* to visit Abubu—his *negeri*—until the final evacuation from Ambon to Seram in November 1950.[5] Manusama's political career gained a new lease on life in 1949 with his appointment to the NIT Senate. As appointed politicians, he, and to a greater extent Soumokil, developed successful careers in the NIT. Neither Soumokil, Manusama nor Nanlohy had been supporters of the loyalist and separatist organizations in Ambon prior to the transfer of sovereignty. An independent South Moluccas only became an object of Soumokil and Manusama's political endeavors when the government of the NIT, in which their political careers were founded, collapsed. In the leadership of an independent South Moluccas, they finally acquired a role of appropriate status their own society.

THE SOLDIERS

The other group of emigres to play a role in the RMS were the Ambonese KNIL soldiers. Prior to the Round Table Conference, apart from the occasional acts of intimidation such as when the DMS debated sensitive issues, the soldiers played a minimal role in Ambon politics. Outside the Ambonese islands, they had been members of organizations such as *Ambonschestudiefonds*. Patty had tried to win their support for *Sarekat Ambon*. After the war, the soldiers' support had been mobilized for separatist organizations such as the *Persatoean Timoer Besar* (PTB). The most obvious reason for the minor political role of the soldiers in Ambon itself was the Dutch practice to station few Ambonese soldiers there. Partly this was because they were much more useful elsewhere and partly because of the often difficult relations between returning soldiers and their *negeri*. The difficulties arose over specific issues such as the soldiers reasserting the rights to use land and more

generally what could be termed a clash of status systems. For the most part, the soldiers were not recruited from the families of the *adat* elite in the *negeri*, but had been encouraged in the KNIL to believe in their *bevoorrechte positie*. However, when they returned as "men of the world" their experience and status were often not accorded the desired recognition, nor were the modes of behavior encouraged in the KNIL always appreciated. Reintegration into *negeri* life was further complicated by the dependency of families in the *negeri* on the soldiers' salaries and future pensions, not least at a time when the continuation of this source of financial support was in doubt.

In late 1949 and early 1950, for the first time in the history of Ambonese service in the KNIL, large numbers (about 2,000) of Ambonese soldiers were stationed in Ambon to await either transfer to the Indonesian Army (*Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat*, later *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) or demobilization. The Ambon they found was very different from the one they idealized in the *tangsi* (barracks) and had left before or immediately after the war. Their homeland was under the administration of Ambonese who saw their political futures in Indonesia. The only effective political organization (*Partai Indonesia Merdeka*) was a supporter of the government they had been fighting for the past four years and that organization's youthful supporters were conducting military-style exercises in the streets of Ambon.

The soldiers became active, and not merely verbal, participants in the struggle for control of Ambonese society. Initially, their support was enlisted by leaders of the PTB and some *raja* to cleanse nationalist influence from *negeri*. In January 1950, soldiers clashed with nationalist *pemuda*, but shortly afterwards the nationalists tried to win the soldiers over. However, in April it was their fellow emigres, Manusama, Soumokil and Alex Nanlohy, who succeeded in mobilizing the soldiers' support in a last ditch attempt to prevent the landing of the former enemies' troops in their homeland.

One of the most striking consequences of the RMS and its suppression has been the virtual disappearance of soldiers as a distinctive social group. Some 4,000 soldiers, and their families, went into exile. Only a few had transferred to the Indonesian Army prior to the RMS. Of those who fought with the RMS (about 2,000), a significant number were enlisted in the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI) and fought with distinction against the *Darul Islam* and the Permesta rebellion. Thomas Nussy, the *beret* leader who was instrumental in mobilizing the soldiers' support for Soumokil and Manusama, made a name for himself as a TNI officer during the Trikora campaign against the Dutch in West New Guinea. Neither the former RMS soldiers nor the Ambonese who have subsequently joined the TNI have formed a privileged group within it, as they had done in the KNIL.

THE RAJA

The most important Ambon-based leaders involved in the RMS were from among the *raja*, both Christian and Moslem. They had earlier been a core group in

the separatist organizations. Indicative of the long-term patterns of social change—the contraction of *raja* power—was their relatively minor and subservient role both in the separatist organizations and the RMS. Only Ibrahim Ohorella, the *Raja* of Moslem *negeri* Tulehu, could be counted among the promoters of the RMS. He provided the venue for the crucial meeting of conspirators prior to the proclamation, organized and transported most of the crowd for Manusama's mass meeting on 18 April and for the meeting on the night of the proclamation and later became a Minister in the RMS government. D. J. Gaspersz, the *raja* of Christian Naku and veteran *bestuursassistent*, was included in the cabinet, more for his long bureaucratic experience than his commitment to the RMS cause.

The long-term contraction of *raja* power and the failure to compete in the relatively open political system with nationalist politicians and other educated urban leaders has already been discussed. When the Dutch returned, the *raja* had expected nothing more than the re-establishment of the prewar status quo. They found it incomprehensible that the Dutch were intent on the establishment of an apparently independent Indonesia and that their protestations—that they wanted to remain part of the kingdom—were ignored. Close to home, many of the *raja* were confronted with opposition groups within their own *negeri*, in the postwar period identified with PIM. Ohorella illustrates this problem well. Although he was a formidable figure in his *negeri*, Tulehu was also the major center of PIM support outside Ambon Town. Many of the nationalist *pemuda*, who so provoked the returned soldiers in late 1949 and early 1950, were from Tulehu. In the minds of many *raja*, an independent Indonesia was associated with opposition groups in their own *negeri*. Under the RMS, the opposition groups were suppressed and the *raja* were rewarded for their support when the parliament was created. All the *raja* became ex-officio members.

The proclamation and eventual suppression of the RMS left no Ambonese victors. The RMS leaders were dispersed or captured and politically discredited. None of them exercised any influence in post-RMS Ambon politics. The nationalist politicians fared little better for they had failed to persuade their compatriots that their future prosperity and development was to be found in the Indonesian Republic. Their ineffectiveness only served to confirm the emigre Ambonese and non-Ambonese view that there had never been a nationalist movement worthy of the name in Ambon. As understandable as the fear of the Republic was in April 1950 for the promoters of the RMS, the realization of those fears through the proclamation of an independent state, devoid of any forethought or planning, proved to be tragedy for the society it was supposed to protect.

NOTES

1. These figures relate to "Ambonese" resident in the *afdeeling* Amboina.

2. The title *raja* is used in this article as a shorthand for the three Ambonese terms for village head: *raja*, *patih* and *orang kaya*.

3. "Ambonese" soldiers from Menado are not included in these figures.

4. Of the Ambonese resident in Java and Madura, only 0.6 percent (70 people) were Moslems.

5. Manusama, interview, Capelle a/d Ijssel, 17-1-78.

REFERENCES

Bartels, D. 1977. Guarding the invisible mountain: Inter-village alliances, religious syncretism and ethnic identity among Christians and Moslems in the Central Moluccas. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.

Chauvel, R. H. 1981. Stagnatie, exodus en frustratie: Economische geschiedenis van Ambon van 1863 tot 1950. *Intermediair* (February). Amsterdam.

———. 1985. *The Rising Sun in the Spice Islands: A history of Ambon during the Japanese Occupation*. Working Paper 37, Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.

Dames, G. W. T. 1954. *Oom Ambon van het KNIL*. 's-Gravenhage.

Gent, L. F. van. 1924. *Nederland-Ambon (1896–1921)*. Weltevreden: Balai Pustaka.

Knaap, G. J. 1987. *Kruidnagelen en Christenen: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de Bevolking van Ambon 1656–1696*. Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde. Verhandelingen 125. Dordrecht.

Manusama, A. Th. 1919. *Beknopt Geschiedenis der Vereeniging Ambonschestudiefonds, 1909–1919*. Weltevreden.

Ouwerling, Ch. Chr. [H. J. Jansen]. 1932. Bestuursmemorie van den aftredenden Resident der Molukken, 1930, mr. 169/1932.

Politiek Verslag Residentie Amboina 1870. ANRI.

Schmidt, H. J. 1924. Memorie van Overgave van de afdeeling Amboina 1924. Section F, Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde. Leiden.

Residentie Amboina. 1880. Stand van de Zaken, Residentie Amboina, September 1880, mr. 349/1880.

Residentie Amboina. 1881. Stand van de Zaken, Residentie Amboina, April 1881, mr. 492/1881

Sandick, L. H. W. van. 1926. Memorie van Overgave den Gouverneur der Molukken, mr. 2336/1926.

———. 1927 Gouverneur der Molukken, Nota van Bestuursbeleid, mr. 1464/1927.

Tausikal, A. and M. A. Halim. 1951. De Islam in de Molukken. *Cultureel Nieuws Indonesië* 2.

Volkstelling 1930. 1936. Batavia: Departement van Economische Zaken.

"NOW WE FOLLOW *OUR FATHER*": CHRISTIANITY, COLONIALISM, AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION ON THE ISLAND OF DAMER, MALUKU TENGARRA[1]

SANDRA PANNELL
THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE

Writing of "social structure" in "eastern Indonesia," F. A. E. van Wouden observed that "the mingling of patrilineal and matrilineal elements ... in this area is a natural result of a former double-unilateral system" (1968:157). Social and cultural difference in van Wouden's paradigm is regarded as a consequence of the "disintegration" of an ancient proto-Indonesian form of social organization founded upon the principles of double descent and asymmetric marriage alliance.

With specific reference to the people of Amaya (*Mayawo*) on the island of Damer, one of a "chain of islands joining Timor and Tanimbar" of which van Wouden noted that no useful information is available, this paper argues that, contra van Wouden, cultures cannot be isolated from the wider social, historical and political context of which they are part. Central to this view, is the notion that local social organization is informed and transformed through the dialectical engagement with alternative, often introduced, ideologies and ontologies. In this connection, I suggest that the historical conjunction of colonialism and Christianity with the logic of *Mayawo* cultural practices has served, as Bruner put it, to "open up new spaces" (1986:152) within which local notions of social relatedness, affiliation and identity are expressed.

INTRODUCTION

> ...the transformation of a culture is a mode of its reproduction.
> Marshall Sahlins (1985:138)

Writing of social organization in the "Southwestern Islands"[2] of the Moluccas, the Dutch anthropologist J. P. B. de Josselin de Jong observed that,

> it is hardly to be doubted that the clan organization of all of these islands have developed from "double systems" ... and this origin explains both the existence of patrilineal and matrilineal organizations in neighboring and closely related communities and the vacillating between patrilineal and matrilineal clan-heredity (1937:12).